I am an Academic Fellow at De Montfort University in Leicester.
This semester I am teaching Applied Mathematics at De Montfort University.
Last semester I thaught Mathematics for Communications.
My research area is in Algorithms and more specifically Algorithmic Game Theory and Mechanism Design.
My research focuses on designing auctions for multi-parameter domains.
My PhD and a some of my follow-up work focuses on an auction for allocating jobs, the game-theoretic version of the seminal scheduling unrelated machines problem. The machines are selfish and won't reveal their processing times for the jobs without getting the correct payment. So in fact the setting is more like the setting of an auction for selling multiple distinct items. Which are the possible mechanisms we can use for the allocating the tasks? I have made crucial steps toward resolving this very important problem however the lower bound I gave in 2007 still hasn't been improved.
Other problems I find tempting are adword auctions, cost sharing, secretary problems, voting, computation of equilibria. I also enjoy computational algebra and geometry.
A short presentation about one of my favourite topics from algorithms: the heap data structure
An intro to utility elicitation
"Lügen, Versteigerungen und Zeitplanung": Ein kurzer, einfacher Text der erklärt womit ich mich in meiner Disertation beschäftigt habe. (auf Deutsch)
Το πρόβλημα του τερματισμού (the halting problem) παρουσίαση στο Famelab
Positions and Research stays [full CV in pdf version]
- Academic Fellow (2017-), De Montfort Unviersity, Leicester, UK
- Ernst and Young advisory (2016-2017), Athens, Greece
- Post-Doctoral Researcher (2015-2016) at Teesside University, UK
- Post-Doctoral Researcher (2012-2013) at Pierre and Marie Curie University, Paris, France
- Post-Doctoral Researcher (2012-2014) at Duke University, Department of Computer Science in the group of Vincent Conitzer.
- Post-Doctoral Researcher (2010-2012), University of Vienna, Austria
- Research stay: Institute for Advanced Studies, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 23.5- 19.6.11
- Post-Doctoral Scholar (2009-2010) Max-Planck Institut für Informatik, Saarbrücken, Germany
- Ranked 2nd at a Maitre des Conferences Position, Universite d'Artois, 2015
- Ranked 3nd at a Maitre des Conferences Position, Universite Paris Dauphine 2014
- Senior Lecturer and Head of Department offer, University of Fiji, 2014 (declined)
- W1 Juniorprofessur, University of Siegen, Germany, 2010 (declined)
- PhD (2005-2009) University of Athens, Department of Informatics, (with Hons.) Advisor: Elias Koutsoupias
- Master's (2003-2005) Inter-university Program in Logic, Algorithms and Computation (MPLA) (with Hons.), ranked 1st, Advisor: Yiannis Moschovakis
- Bachelor's (1999-2003), University of Athens, Department of Mathematics (with Hons.), ranked at the top 1% Summer semester 2003: Technical University of Vienna (TUW)
- Austrian Research Association (ÖFG) (Austria) (travel grant), 2011
- Alexander von Humbolt Foundation (Germany) (Post Doc Research Fellowship), 2010
- General Secretariat for Research and Technology (for PhD studies) 2005-2008
- Alexandros Onassis foundation (for graduate studies) 2004-2005
- Association for Symbolic Logic (ASL) (USA) (travel grant), June, 2005
- Greek State Scholarships Foundation (ΙΚΥ) (ranked 1st), 2004-2005 (declined)
- Greek State Scholarships Foundation (ΙΚΥ) (ranked 1st), 2003-2004
- University of Athens, Antonis Papadakis fund (for undergraduate studies) 2001-2003
- Erasmus (European Commission exchange program), summer semester 2003
- Greek State Scholarships Foundation (ΙΚΥ) (ranked 5th) 1999-2000
Papers in Conferences
Towards a characterization of budget-feasible mechanisms with monitoring, Paolo Serafino, Carmine Ventre and Angelina Vidali, submitted 2017, preliminary version at ACAC’16 [slides]
• A characterization of n-player strongly monotone scheduling mechanisms, Annamaria Kovacs and Angelina Vidali, 25th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI'15) [poster] [slides] [paper]
• Mechanism Design for Scheduling with Uncertain Execution Time. Vincent Conitzer and Angelina Vidali 26th Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI'14) [poster] [slides] [paper]
• Approximating Utopia: Strong Truthfulness and Externality-Resistant Mechanisms
Amos Fiat, Anna Karlin, Elias Koutsoupias and Angelina Vidali, 4th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS'13) [paper]
• Extending characterizations from subdomains to domains. Angelina Vidali, 7th Workshop in Internet and Network Economics, (WINE '11) [slides] [paper] [video]
A preliminary version was presented at the Innovations in Algorithmic Game Theory workshop.
• Multi-parameter mechanism design under budget and matroid constraints. Monika Henzinger and Angelina Vidali, 19th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms, (ESA'11)
A preliminary version was presented at the Workshop GREAT: Economic and Algorithmic Theory Week. [slides] [paper]
• A complete characterization of group-strategyproof mechanisms of cost-sharing. Emmanouil Pountourakis and Angelina Vidali, (ESA'10) 18th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms, also invited to the special issue of Algorithmica for ESA. [slides] [paper]
• A characterization of 2-player mechanisms for scheduling. George Christodoulou, Elias Koutsoupias and Angelina Vidali, 16th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA '08). [slides] [paper]
• A $1+\phi$ lower bound for truthful scheduling mechanisms. Elias Koutsoupias and Angelina Vidali, 32nd International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS '07). [slides] [paper]
• A lower bound for scheduling mechanisms. George Christodoulou, Elias Koutsoupias and Angelina Vidali, 18th ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA'07). [slides] [paper]
Papers in Journals
• A $1+\phi$ lower bound for truthful scheduling mechanisms. Elias Koutsoupias and Angelina Vidali,
• A complete characterization of group-strategyproof mechanisms of cost-sharing. Emmanouil Pountourakis and Angelina Vidali,
Algorithmica special issue for ESA'10 . DOI: 10.1007/s00453-011-9602-6
• A lower bound for scheduling mechanisms. George Christodoulou, Elias Koutsoupias and Angelina Vidali,
Algorithmica 55(4): 729-740, 2009.
COST IC1205 Summer School on Fair Division, Grenoble, France, 2015